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Abstract 
 
Though the response of trade unions to activation policies seems a crucial test of 
their capacity to adapt to the challenges of post-industrialisation, the issue has to date 
received little systematic attention in the welfare state or labour market policy 
literature. This paper takes a first step in remedying this curious neglect. Drawing on 
relevant theoretical literature it first briefly outlines two very contrasting perspectives 
on how unions’ broad adaptation strategies could be expected to shape their attitude 
to activation reforms. It then analyses the role played by unions across around twenty 
years of labour market policy reforms in three strategically selected national case 
studies, confronting the differing assumptions to some preliminary empirical 
evidence. The cross-case evidence suggests that union attitudes to activation policies 
are rarely unambiguous reflections of either pure sectionalism or planned 
revitalisation platforms, but are instead shaped by a mix of strategic policy trade-offs, 
institutional incentives as well, at times, by the influence of new policy ideas. 
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Introduction1 
 
Activation has been central to most of the blueprints for the adapting welfare 
states to a fundamentally transformed social and economic structure that have been 
published in the last decade. ‘From unemployment insurance to employability’ was, 
for example, the first heading in the agenda for welfare state reform mapped out 
nearly a decade ago by Ferrera and Rhodes (2000). Activation is a core principle of 
many policy frameworks that have been envisioned to recast social protection for 
post-industrial labour markets characterised by both individual premiums on mobility 
and collective risks of polarisation. The activation agenda has also been 
enthusiastically taken up by international organisations and governments from 
different ends of the political spectrum, as well as those pursing apparently post-
partisan ‘third way’ approaches, in which activation policies have been very 
prominent (Clasen and Clegg, 2004). 
 
The breadth of activation’s political appeal can be explained in large part by its 
fundamental ambiguity (Bonoli, 2010). Market-reinforcing activation policies2 have 
become popular at a time of increasing wage inequality and expansion of precarious 
employment in low-end services. Their ambiguity resides in the fact that they can 
either be seen as upholding and enforcing this new labour market structure, notably 
by closing off exit routes out of the labour market, or as an attempt to make it more 
socially inclusive and sustainable by combating risks of detachment faced by 
vulnerable groups with low skills and limited market power.  
 
This ambiguity helps us to understand why activation policies would appeal to 
political parties pursuing the support of the median voter. Successful social and 
labour market policy reform does not only turn on the construction of winning 
electoral coalitions, however. Corporate social actors, and especially trade unions, are 
also key actors in the politics of welfare state transformation. Despite declining 
membership rates, trade unions still have the capacity to mobilise citizens against 
reforms that they oppose. Particularly where they have a role in the governance and 
administration of traditional welfare state policies, such as pensions and 
unemployment insurance, they may even be in a position to effectively veto changes 
to which they are hostile (Beland, 2001; Bonoli and Palier, 2000; Ebbinghaus, 2010). 
The assent of national-level trade unions – and employer organisations – may in fact 
be crucial for the effective implementation of some activation policies, particularly 
those that require firm participation (Mosely et al, 1998).      
 
Notwithstanding the strategic significance of unions’ ‘actor orientations’ (cf. 
Scharpf, 1997) for the successful pursuit of activation reforms, little attention has 
been paid to this issue in existing research. While it has been recognised that 
activation may confront unions with a ‘dilemma’ (Valkenburg, 2004), the terms of 
this dilemma have not been specified in any great detail, and nor have the ways in 
which it is being resolved in different national contexts been systematically explored. 
Do unions see only the bad in activation policies, and fall back mechanically on the 
‘conservative’ oppositional strategies with which they are associated in much 
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contemporary popular discourse, and of which there is some evidence from other 
social policy fields (Häusermann, 2010)? Or may they be willing to see opportunities 
and advantages as well as risks in activation, and engage constructively in the 
development of an active social state? Under which conditions will union opposition 
or engagement be more likely? 
 
The present article attempts to provide a preliminary response to questions of 
this nature. The first section contrasts two broad perspectives on trade unions’ 
response to a changing social and economic environment, which we loosely term 
‘sectionalism’ and ‘revitalisation’, and draws out the logical implications of each for 
anticipated union attitudes to activation policies. The following sections then 
confront these differing perspectives to the findings from a qualitative cross-national 
comparison of unions’ role in activation reforms in three European countries, 
France, Italy and the Netherlands. The third section identifies a number of factors, 
beyond sectionalism and revitalisation, that the case studies suggest many help to 
better understand patterns of union reaction to reforms of this kind. A brief final 
section concludes. 
 
 
Sectionalism or revitalisation? Contrasting perspectives on unions 
and activation 
 
Writing a decade ago, Crouch (2000: 71) argued that one of the key challenges 
facing trade unions was a risk that they “may come to represent secure labour market 
insiders whose position is envied and resented by outsiders drifting between 
temporary work and unemployment, against whose interests unions then start to 
work”. The suggestion is that unions’ mechanical response to labour market change 
may thus be sectional, as they seek to protect and narrowly promote the policy 
interests of their remaining core membership, even as their numbers are in decline. 
Recent work on so-called ‘insider-outsider politics’ in labour market policy has 
seemed to confirm the saliency of this perspective for understanding the 
development of activation policies. In a series of influential publications, Rueda 
(2005; 2006; 2007) has suggested that in labour markets characterised by strong 
employment protection legislation (EPL), social democratic parties tend not to 
promote policies that help the unemployed back into the private labour market. The 
reason is that as vote seekers these parties will rationally act in the interests of their 
‘core constituency’ of securely employed insiders, who are not supportive of 
activation policies. In addition to deriving no personal benefit from these policies 
due to their relative insulation from the risk of unemployment in highly regulated 
labour markets, insiders will, according to Rueda, baulk at supporting the costs they 
entail. Moreover and more importantly, insiders will also fear that such policies will, 
if successful, increase competitive pressures on the labour market and undermine 
insider opportunities for rent-seeking. 
 
To the extent that this argument is correct, it seems to have clear implications 
for trade unions, which have a strong membership bias towards employed workers, 
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albeit with some cross-national variation (Ebbinghaus, 2006). Though he doesn’t 
explicitly focus on unions in his work, Rueda has indeed argued that in the British 
case it was partly the weakening of its institutional linkages with the trade unions that 
freed New Labour to focus more on outsider interests, and encouraged it to turn to 
activation policies in the mid-1990s (Rueda, 2006: 365). Likewise, Saint-Paul (1998: 
154) did explicitly argue that his very similar insider-outsider model of low support 
for active policies could be assumed to hold under assumptions of electoral 
determination of policy outcomes or corporatist determination, “where unions … 
decide on labour market policy”. According to the logic of the insider-outsider 
theory, then, we would expect unions to have at best ambivalent attitudes to 
proposals for the reinforcement of activation policies (and unemployment benefits), 
at least where EPL is strong. 
 
Assuming unchanged labour market institutions, both Rueda and Saint-Paul 
agree that insider support for activation policies will likely increase in the event of a 
sharp increase in unemployment resulting from a macro-economic shock, due to 
previously secure workers becoming suddenly more exposed to the risk of 
unemployment3. Saint-Paul departs more from Rueda, however, in pointing out that 
substantial temporal and cross-national variation in the generosity of ‘passive’ 
support for the unemployed might also impact on the operation of this mechanism. 
If unemployment benefits are high, he reasons, insiders might be more readily 
persuaded to support activation measures, out of a desire to reduce their medium-term 
tax burden (ibid: 153; see also Gaston and Rajaguru (2008)). How far this taxation 
effect would be expected to trump insider fears about low-wage competition is left as 
an empirical question that Saint-Paul does not directly try to resolve. In any event, 
high unemployment benefits represent, along with a macro-economic shock, the only 
conditions that qualify the expectation in insider-outsider theories that unions will 
tend to oppose the development of activation policies. 
 
The assumption of knee-jerk sectionalism that underpins the insider-outsider 
approach to union behaviour is itself perhaps questionable, however. Industrial trade 
unions – if not craft unions – have always derived a large part of their legitimacy 
from missions and roles that go far beyond the simple defence of their members 
(Bode, 1997; Streeck, 2005). More importantly perhaps they are also ‘vote seekers’, 
and thus have structural incentives in this regard that are not so dissimilar to social 
democratic parties, who have been shown capable of revolutionising their policy 
platforms in a bid to appeal to new sections of the electorate (Bonoli and Powell, 
2003; Green-Pedersen and van Kersbergen, 2002). Though unions are membership 
associations, and derive no small share of their resources from their current 
adherents, as corporate entities they also enjoy at least some autonomy from their 
‘base’ and have genuine capacities for strategic action. For these reasons we might 
expect there to be both motivations and possibilities for unions to adopt less narrow 
and sectionalist stances on labour market policy than the insider-outsider approach 
allows. 
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The literature on the politics of welfare state change has rarely credited unions 
with such reflexiveness and strategic capacity. By contrast, the broader literature on 
so-called union revitalisation (e.g. Baccaro et al., 2003; Frege and Kelly, 2003; Hyman, 
1994) has extensively documented the attempts of unions, largely for recruitment 
reasons, to take up the causes and interests of workers beyond their core 
membership. From the perspective of this literature, the championing of activation 
policies that assist unemployed workers in entering the labour market would be 
attractive to unions as part of a more general strategy of agenda broadening. 
Moreover, insofar as these policies are actually effective in combating 
unemployment, then a revitalisation stance that emphasised the fight against 
unemployment and labour market exclusion could be expected to bring even more 
concrete and short-term membership benefits for unions. As Visser (2002: 424) has 
pointed out, “unemployment hurts unions, except under specific institutional 
conditions that have become rare”. Only in the few countries with voluntary state-
subsidised systems of unemployment insurance (so-called ‘Ghent systems’) do the 
unemployed tend to remain union members in large number. By contrast, after 
controlling for the presence/absence of local union representatives, it does not 
appear that temporary and otherwise ‘atypical’ employment contracts are as much of 
an obstacle to unionisation as has long been assumed (Sanchez, 2007). Unions may 
thus have a specific recruitment interest in supporting activation policies, even if they 
move people into an increasingly flexible labour market. 
 
In summary, then, very different predictions regarding the unions’ reactions to 
activation policies can be derived from the two dominant perspectives on their 
broader adaptation strategies in a context of profound labour market change. Those 
who emphasise the risks of sectionalism would expect unions to – except under 
certain clearly specified conditions - retreat to a narrow defence of the interests of 
insiders, for whom activation policies have no real benefits and quite possibly carry 
some costs. By contrast, those who see the potential for revitalisation would expect 
unions to champion activation measures, less through altruism than in the interest of 
medium-term organisational survival. These possibilities are of course not mutually 
exclusive and the two strategies may – indeed probably would – be expected to 
coexist, in which case one would expect to see structural indecision and/or a 
succession of conflicts opposing union leaderships to their established bases. 
 
 
Trade unions and activation policies in France, Italy and the 
Netherlands  
 
In the following section we explore how far the logics of sectionalism and/or 
revitalisation discussed above can help us to understand the reaction of unions to 
activation policies over a time period of around 20 years in three national cases, 
France, Italy and the Netherlands. These cases have a number of similarities. In each, 
EPL is relatively strict in comparative perspective, and has been rather stable over 
the past two decades; the institutional preconditions for an insider-outsider cleavage 
thus exist and persist across the observation period. None of these countries have 
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‘Ghent systems’ of unemployment insurance, which provide selective incentives for 
the unemployed to remain union members and reduce putative ‘insider bias’. In each 
country union density among the unemployed is thus far lower than among the 
employed, albeit less so in the Netherlands than in France and Italy (cf. Table 1). 
 
 
Country Union Density Unemployed Union Density Employed 
France 2% 18.5% 
Italy 5.7% 36.3% 
Netherlands 17.4% 32.4% 
 
Table 1: Union Density of Employed and Unemployed, circa 2000 
Source: Ebbinghaus (2006) 
 
 
Similarities also exist between the cases in the structure of the union movements 
and their articulation with the political system. In each country organised labour is 
internally divided, the legacy of religious and/or political cleavages that have 
attenuated somewhat over time (though less so in France than in Italy or the 
Netherlands). Such fragmentation of course makes it rather harder to speak of and 
analyse a single ‘actor orientation’ among trade unions. The competitive context in 
which the national unions operate in each case, however, brings to the surface a 
number of disputes that would otherwise remain internal or even submerged, and 
thus allows the strategic trading of potentially conflicting interests to be examined 
more closely. Although some country specificities can be noted, in none of the 
countries is there a symbiotic relationship between any of the trade unions 
confederations and any of the parties of government, meaning that union reaction to 
a given policy can be analysed broadly independently from the ‘colour’ of the 
government sponsoring the policy. 
 
Comparable in a number of important respects, the three cases nonetheless have 
some significant differences that we might expect to impact on the attitude of unions 
to activation policies. First, while unemployment has remained high across the whole 
period in Italy and France, in the Netherlands it fell to exceptionally low levels 
between the early and mid-2000s, although non-employment remained high. Second, 
though they have been becoming more generous in recent years, unemployment 
benefit provisions remain far more residual in Italy than in either France or the 
Netherlands, potentially diminishing the fiscal benefits of activation reforms for 
insiders there. Finally, the institutional involvement of the unions in social policy 
making varies both across the cases and over time. In the Netherlands, the unions 
retain their role in influential national level corporatist structures, but have been 
progressively excluded from lower-level governance structures in the labour market 
policy sphere specifically since the mid-1990s. In Italy, unions have traditionally had 
fewer institutionalised roles in either general national institutions or specific policy 
structures. Contrary to the Netherlands, though, their involvement in such 
arrangements has been growing in the recent period. In France there has been less 
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change over time; though general socio-economic concertation has been and remains 
weakly institutionalised in France, the unions and employers co-manage the core 
social policy arrangements, especially the unemployment insurance system. As the 
following discussion shows, it is these institutional differences that in fact offer some 
of the best explanations of the pattern of the unions reactions to activation policies 
in the three countries since the early 1990s. 
 
France 
 
The two large union confederations that have been most vocal regarding 
questions of unemployment and labour market policy in France, the CFDT 
(Confédération Française Démocratique des Travailleurs) and FO (Force Ouvrière), have long 
defended rather different positions with respect to the question of the activation of 
the unemployed4. Already at the time of the belated creation of a compulsory 
unemployment insurance scheme in France, in 1958, the then CFTC (future CFDT) 
was already arguing that the new system should not be limited to the payment of 
benefits to the unemployed, but also take measures to ensure the rapid reintegration 
and re-adaptation of unemployed workers (Daniel, 1997: 141). This position was 
opposed mainly by the government of the time, which objected to the idea that the 
new unemployment insurance institution UNEDIC – which was to be co-managed 
by the unions and the employers associations on the basis of national-level collective 
agreements, extended by law – might encroach on the competences of the state in 
matters of employment. FO, the most enthusiastic proponent of a bi-partite (in 
French, paritaire) governance system for unemployment insurance, fell in line with the 
position of the government, and supported the strict separation between 
unemployment compensation and employment promotion issues.  
 
This position, arguably initially adopted for the strategic reason of encouraging 
the government’s agreement of the paritaire schema for unemployment insurance, 
would over time evolve into a strong doctrinal stance for FO. With FO co-presiding 
UNEDIC from 1959 until 1992, it largely guaranteed that propositions to put in 
place more active strategies for the treatment of insured unemployment benefit 
recipients were headed-off, whether they were mooted by Conservative or by 
Socialist governments, and with only minimal discussion of their substantive 
implications for the functioning of the labour market.  
 
The incentive to defend the autonomy of the paritaire unemployment insurance 
system was sufficiently strong to also encourage the CFDT, once it had captured the 
co-presidency of UNEDIC from FO in the early 1990s, to quietly retreat from its 
traditional stance in favour of more active treatment of the unemployed. Despite a 
context of fast-rising unemployment, the CFDT and the employers’ association 
agreed in 1992 to swingeing cuts in unemployment insurance benefits, allowing the 
unemployment insurance fund to partially absorb its deficit without having to appeal 
to the government for supplementary resources. The cuts were operated through the 
introduction of a new ‘single degressive benefit’ (Allocation Unique Dégressive, AUD), 
with ‘degressivity’ referring to a mechanism whereby benefit amounts were sharply 
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reduced at 4-monthly intervals. This simple retrenchment was defended as a form of 
‘active policy’ by the then president of the CFDT Nicole Notat, who argued that it 
would “encourage dynamic behaviour among the unemployed and stimulate them in 
their professional reintegration” (cited in Le Monde, 18/8/1992). When in the 
following year - and with the unemployment insurance system still facing a sizeable 
deficit - a report commissioned by the government proposed enhancing the tax-
financing of the unemployment insurance system as part of a reform package that 
would see a closer integration between UNEDIC and the state run public 
employment service (Agence Nationale Pour l’Emploi, ANPE), the CFDT rallied instead 
to the idea of further cuts in unemployment benefits to avoid a structural reform that 
would endanger paritarisme (Clegg, 2005: 243). 
 
The defence of the autonomy of the paritaire unemployment benefit system thus 
traditionally tended to drive the French unions into positions of strategic opposition 
to activation policies that could concern the insured unemployed. With respect to 
activation policies for working age people in receipt of other social benefits, 
however, the unions were always more enthusiastic. When in the mid-1980s debates 
were raging in France over the introduction and design of a general social assistance 
scheme to provide support to those who fell through the social insurance net, the 
unions generally came down in favour of benefit policies that included a work or 
training condition for the recipient (Bode, 1991). Commenting on a proposition of 
this kind put forward by a report to the Social and Economic Council in 1987, and 
which foreshadowed the future Revenu Minimum d’Insertion (RMI) scheme introduced 
in late 1988, the CFDT noted approvingly that the proposal to link the minimum 
income scheme to an individualised insertion contract “allows the maintenance of 
the work/income link” (Conseil Economique et Social, 1987: 19), while FO commented 
that the proposal had the advantage of “avoiding the absorption of the problem [of 
individuals without social protection] by assistance” (ibid: 21). Both unions reacted in 
a very similar way to propositions for a work-linked ‘autonomy benefit’ for the under 
25s – who are not eligible for general social assistance in France – when there was a 
rash of activity around this subject at the beginning of the 2000s (Conseil Economique et 
Social, 2001: 57-61). 
 
The more positive stance of the French unions with respect to the activation of 
the non-insured unemployed can also be understood in relation to their social 
protection interests as organisations, and specifically their defence of the traditional 
insurance basis of French income protection schemes. Albeit less directly and 
immediately than a statist takeover of the financing and administration of the social 
insurance schemes themselves, the emergence of a large and visible tier of tax-
financed social protection completely disconnected from the operation of the labour 
market would also represent a menace to the legitimacy of the unions’ historic role in 
the French social protection system (Clegg, 2002). It is arguably for this reason that 
they traditionally embraced activation initiatives in social assistance while resisting 
their extension to unemployment insurance. 
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Since the very end of the 1990s, however, this traditionally ‘dualistic’ response 
pattern by the French unions to activation reforms has in turn begun to give way to a 
more general pattern of critical support, notably thanks to the unions warming to the 
development of activation measures within the framework of unemployment 
insurance. The strategic context for this shift has been the growing determination of 
first the French employers and more recently the government to generalise activation 
reforms. In this context the development of activation initiatives has come to be seen 
by the unions not as a menace to the autonomy of UNEDIC, but as a condition of 
its continued existence. 
 
The French employers’ association, who co-manage UNEDIC with the unions, 
were historically barely more enthusiastic about activating the insured unemployed 
than the unions. Also valuing the autonomy of the paritaire unemployment insurance 
system, and particularly the opportunities it afforded for member firms in key 
industries to manage lay-offs, the employers were reticent to see the system drawn 
into the sphere of public labour market policy, and for much of the 1980s and 1990s 
found it in practice more expedient to reach agreement with unions on parametric 
changes to unemployment insurance than to really follow-through on the ambitious 
structural reform agendas that they claimed, in principle, to champion (Clegg, 2005: 
246-8). This situation however changed dramatically in the late 1990s. In large part in 
response to the Socialist-led government’s high profile legislation on the 35-hour 
working week, and in the context of a shift in power between different federations 
within the main employers’ confederation5, the employers launched an ambitious 
structural reform agenda called the refondation sociale in which the thoroughgoing 
activation of unemployment benefits was a showpiece proposal. Ostensibly designed 
to embarrass the government, these measures also directly menaced the survival of 
the paritaire social protection institutions such as UNEDIC, which the employers 
threatened to suspend their participation in if negotiations over their reform projects 
were not successfully concluded. 
 
Faced with this menace, the French unions rallied at differing speeds to idea of 
putting in place a mechanism which linked receipt of unemployment insurance 
benefits to an individualised agreement detailing the rights and responsibilities of the 
unemployment individual, eventually introduced under the name of the Plan d’Aide au 
Retour à l’Emploi (PARE). For the CFDT, historically more positive about the 
principle of activation, the acceptance of this negotiating agenda was swift, with 
activation having a prominent place in their statement of initial positions ahead of 
the negotiations in spring 2000 (CFDT, 2000). Along with the CGT, FO ultimately 
refused to sign the agreement on the PARE, but had shown a growing if still 
grudging willingness to entertain the principle of activation during the negotiations, 
in the framework of its overarching concern to prevent the collapse of the paritaire 
unemployment benefit system. Indeed, the latter took precedence over more 
substantive issues regarding the calibration of rights and responsibilities for the 
unemployment in the positions of FO; in the middle of the wrangle provoked by the 
government’s initial refusal to approve the agreement introducing the PARE, the 
general secretary of FO published a newspaper article simply entitled ‘Paritarisme 
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must be saved’ (Le Monde, 2/8/2000). For all the unions bar the CGT, indeed, 
“concern to globally defend the paritaire institutions was an important factor driving 
the search for compromise” (Freyssinet, 2002: 45). 
 
At the demand of the government, who were concerned about the possible 
emergence of parallel employment service networks for the insured and other 
jobseekers, responsibility for the implementation of the PARE was ultimately vested 
in the ANPE, with the local offices of the unemployment insurance system retaining 
responsibility for the payment of benefits. Criticisms were quickly voiced as to the 
impact of this multi-agency delivery structure on the effectiveness of the new 
activation policy (Cour des Comptes, 2006), and the old idea of a merger between the 
ANPE and UNEDIC gradually returned to the top of the policy agenda. When this 
proposal was announced by Jacques Chirac in his 2007 New Year address to the 
social partners, it met with a flat refusal by the unions, who together with the 
employers organisations issued a common statement of opposition to this measure 
which argued that the best way of fighting unemployment was a “general policy 
promoting growth” (cited in Les Echos, 12/1/2007). But when barely 8 months later 
it was reiterated by the freshly elected President Sarkozy in his first high profile social 
affairs speech, the reaction of the unions was far less hostile, with the General 
Secretary of the CFDT calling the merger a “useful reform process, in which the 
CFDT is ready to engage” (cited in Les Echos, 19/09/2007). Negotiations ensued, and 
the law on the reform of the organisation of the public employment service voted 
less than 5 months later. 
 
Why this seemingly radical change of position of the unions, or at least the 
CFDT, on the further development of activation measures in such a short period of 
time? Part can be explained by Sarkozy’s affirmation that “evidently” the social 
partners would “preserve all their prerogatives concerning the determination of 
benefit rules” (Présidence de la République, 2007a), leveraging the unions agreement by 
opening the door to the continued existence of UNEDIC, albeit stripped of its 
delivery-level functions. Chirac had however by no means foreclosed such a 
compromise either, having spoken of the need for the social partners to play a 
continuing managerial role, alongside the state, in the new public employment service 
he proposed in only rather vague terms (Présidence de la République, 2007b). Most likely 
the key was that the unions judged that under Sarkozy, buoyed by his recent mandate 
and eager to prove his reformist credentials, the risk of a total statist takeover of 
labour market policy was far higher than it had been under Chirac’s last, and highly 
unpopular, government. In this context the preservation of a real, if much reduced, 
role for UNEDIC in French labour market policy was their best possible outcome, 
and engaging in discussions over the further development of activation the price that 
they were willing to pay to obtain it. 
 
Over the medium term, the reaction of French unions to activation initiatives 
has thus been neither generally supportive nor generally oppositional. Instead, the 
unions’ responses first followed a dualistic pattern, before later becoming more 
generally supportive. As described above, the constant across the whole period has 
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been the unions’ strategic desire to safeguard their prerogatives in the administrative 
structures of French labour market policy, and specifically in UNEDIC. The impact 
of this preoccupation on their attitude to activation policies has been shaped by the 
location of those policies in different parts of the social protection system, as well as 
by the changing positions and power resources of other actors in the policy system. 
Far more than any bias or change in their strategies of interest representation, it is 
thus the strategic pursuit of organisational interests under changing political 
conditions that can best explain the dynamics of union reactions to activation 
policies in France. 
 
Italy 
 
As already shown in Table 1, Italian union density is slightly above the EU 
average and also above the French and Dutch figure. With respect to the 
unemployed, however, the situation is quite different, since only a very limited 
number of unemployed are represented by trade unions (on the limits of unemployed 
representation in Italy see also Baglioni et al, 2008). The main peculiarity of the Italian 
trade unions, however, is that they are very strong in the representation of 
pensioners’ interests. In 2010 pensioners represented 47.5% of the total membership 
of the three main industrial trade unions in Italy. As a result, at least from early 1990s 
onwards, Italian trade unions were particularly mobilised in the pension policy field. 
As Natali (2000: 34; see also Jessoula, 2009) shows, during this period the Italian 
trade unions were strongly concerned about pensions reforms since their main 
constituents could be seriously affected by them: in the Italian case “[t]he unions’ 
consent was the first step towards the subsequent adoption of the new legislation by 
the Parliament”.  
 
Despite being primarily focused on pension policies, however, over the years the 
trade unions also became heavily involved in reform processes around employment 
policies (Mania and Sateriale, 2002; Gualmini and Ferrera, 2004), albeit with varying 
patterns of support and opposition. The 1997 Treu reform adopted by a centre-left 
government (clearly inspired by an activation principle; see Barberi and Fargion, 
2004; Graziano, 2007) was fully supported by the unions, whereas the 2003 Biagi 
reform adopted by a centre-right government (even more openly inspired by an 
activation and flexibility principle; see Jessoula et al 2010) was only supported by 
CISL (Confederazione Italiana Sindacati dei Lavoratori) and UIL (Unione Italiana del Lavoro), 
while the largest union – CGIL (Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro) – opposed 
the reform fiercely. But a more favourable orientation of the unions towards 
activation reforms has been reinforced over the years, especially from the second half 
of the 1990s. During the 1980s, only a very diversified and limited consensus on 
activation policies could be detected among the unions (Gualmini, 1998). By 
contrast, interviews conducted in early 2000s (Graziano, 2004) show that even the 
most traditionally ‘oppositional’ union with respect to activation – CGIL – had 
become more supportive.  
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While the opposition of CGIL to the Biagi reform was more connected to a 
broader political conflict engaged with the Berlusconi government which covered 
several social policy issues (see Epifani, CGIL secretary, 2003), it is nevertheless the 
case that from early 1990s to late 2000s the overall attitude of the most reluctant 
trade union has been changing with respect to the activation policies (and in 
particular, with respect to vocational training). Albeit to a lesser extent than CIGL, 
the positions of CISL and UIL have also become more supportive.  
 
The overall commitment to full employment was fully supported by all the trade 
unions from the late 1980s on, and CISL also started to play an increasing role with 
respect to vocational training through a collateral organisation – IAL – which 
benefited significantly from the increased investment in activation. A similar story 
could be told for the less relevant of the ‘big three’ unions, UIL, which mainly 
represents public workers and was always in favour of active measures aimed at 
increasing skills of the workers (not much of unemployed). The only ‘resistant’ 
(initially, at least) trade union was CGIL which had no advantage in supporting 
activation since it was primarily protecting ‘insiders’, and therefore was more 
interested in ‘passive policies’ (where Italian trade unions also play a ‘discretionary 
role’ which is a important source of union power). CGIL poorly represented the 
unemployed.  
 
Nevertheless, from the late 1990s also CGIL started to change ideas with respect 
to activation. The existing limited existing evidence suggests that this was partly due 
to the emergence of new opportunities connected to the implementation of the 
European Employment Strategy (EES), which provided access to some funding 
streams (though the only ‘financial instrument’ supporting the EES is the European 
Social Fund, which is almost exclusively aimed at funding vocational training 
measures). More importantly, with the consolidation of the EES the unions seemed 
to understand that activation policies could be part of a ‘positive sum game’, since 
the governments eagerness to respect EU recommendations in this area reduced 
their focus on changes to EPL, which the unions (and especially CGIL) were mainly 
concerned about in order to maintain the ‘competitive advantages’ of insiders. 
Nevertheless, the unions have played very little attention to the ‘midsiders’ (Jessoula, 
Madama and Graziano, 2010) who increased as a share of the labour force but who 
continued to be under-represented in trade union membership. 
 
Another factor may help us explain the changing attitude of CGIL; the fact that 
the ‘core’ of the union’s activity from the early ‘90s on have not been workers in 
general (including outsiders and ‘midsiders’ such as flexible workers) but insiders and 
pensioners – for which activation was not very relevant, with the exception of 
vocational training ‘on the job’. The overall impression is, in other words, that Italian 
trade unions became increasingly favourable (including CGIL) to activation since it 
was a ‘positive sum game’ and further obtained that the government would not 
reform other – more relevant, for the unions – policy areas such as  pension policy.  
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In sum, the Italian story is a case where attitudes moved significantly (especially 
with respect to the most important trade union, CGIL) from opposition to 
acceptance of activation due to the benefits that this had for the institutional 
consolidation in ‘concertation’ procedures and the expansion of trade union power in 
the vocational training field (which particularly explains the early development of 
vocational training services within CISL) as well as the percolation of (some) 
European ideas connected to activation measures which reinforced the revitalisation 
attempts carried out by the unions. The union attitude was particularly crucial during 
the 1996-2001 and 2006-2008 periods when the ‘concertation’ procedures with the 
centre-left government were established since the governmental coalitions where 
fragmented and there was a further need for social legitimation. The mechanisms of 
such new attitudes are a mix between the ‘rational’ representation of membership 
interests (i.e. predominance of pensioners’ interest over outsiders or ‘midsiders’ 
interests) in the context of changing government priorities, the quest for institutional 
and administrative roles and resources, and selective learning process connected to 
the implementation of the European Employment Strategy.  
 
The Netherlands 
 
In the past two decades, the Netherlands has firmly shed the passive bias of its 
welfare state in favour of a more activating stance. Fundamental to this change have 
been a series of reforms implemented in social security, starting in the early 1990s. 
Where the implementation of social security in the late 1980s could still be 
characterised as “lenient and friendly” (Van der Veen and Trommel, 1999: 291), the 
system underwent a paradigm shift in the 1990s, from one based on rights and duties 
to one based on incentives and disincentives (ibid.: 293). A 1990 report by the 
Scientific Council for Government Policy outlined the parameters for this shift in 
thinking by advocating to couple welfare reforms to activating labour market policies 
(WRR, Een werkend perspectief, 1990). It set the agenda for the remainder of the 1990s, 
when increasing labour force participation became the accepted goal of all societal 
actors. Specific initiatives and proposals have changed over the years (for example, 
from subsidized jobs (so-called Melkert-banen) in the mid 1990s, to a debate on the 
position of temporary workers and flexicurity at the end of the 1990s, to weakening 
employment protection in 2000s), but the emphasis has consistently been on an 
increase in labour force participation and getting people to move (back) into work. 
However, in the course of the 1990s, it also became apparent that for a successful 
change to an activating labour market policy, the Netherlands was facing a problem 
of “missing instruments and failing institutions” (Visser and Hemerijck, 1997:157). 
 
The Dutch trade union confederations have been active participants in the 
debate on the activation of the Dutch state, and have supported – with some caveats 
- the goal of increasing labour force participation in the last two decades. However, 
there is evidence that the precise stance of the trade unions has shifted over the 
period. While in 1999 the social partners were able to hammer out a compromise on 
the implementation of the flexicurity concept in the Foundation of Labour after the 
government parties had failed to reach agreement, the unions have since become 
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increasingly apprehensive about the implementation and effect of activation policies.  
The main trade union federation, FNV (Federatie Nederlandse Vakbeweging), for 
example, has taken to emphasising the guarantee of ‘Decent Work’ rather than any 
work as its primary goal (FNV, 2009).  Furthermore, though the FNV subscribes to 
the view that the entitlement to social security should be tied to the preparedness of 
the active population to engage in paid work, it voices concern that the 
implementation of certain activation measures – particularly those involving market 
principles – will lead to cream skimming and a breakdown of solidarity (ibid.).  In 
other words, the trade unions seem to have changed from eager and active 
participants in the development of activation and full employment policies in the 
1990s to a more reluctant attitude in recent years concerning specific policy 
proposals.  
 
Three pillars characterize activation strategies in the Netherlands: reform of 
social security (including levels and duration of benefits); education and training; and 
reintegration. Interestingly, in the Dutch case changes in these three areas have not 
been limited to changes in policy objectives but have also included significant 
changes in the administration and governance of these areas. In all three areas, 
various rounds of reforms have led to the introduction of market principles in the 
administration, including the involvement of the private sector. For example, the 
restructuring of social security in the 1990s was not limited to changes to benefit 
levels but included fundamental changes to the administration of the system. The 
social partners, who traditionally had a large role in the administration of various 
insurance schemes, were deemed part responsible for the increase in uptake of 
benefits, and to better align the incentives, their role in the administration of social 
security has been progressively reduced. In 1997, the bipartite industrial insurance 
boards were dismantled and the administration of social insurance schemes was 
turned over to private organisations. (Van der Veen and Trommel, 1999).   
 
Similarly, with the stepping up of the emphasis on activation during the 1990s, 
reforms to the Public Employment Service in 1996 and 2001 ironically diluted the 
social partners only recently gained role in the administration of the public 
employment services. Given the success of private employment agencies, who cater 
for those who find themselves temporary out of a job, the 1996 reform mandates the 
PES to focus instead on vulnerable groups in society. Furthermore, the reforms 
conform to changes to benefit policies, and commercializes the relations between the 
PES and local municipalities who administer social benefits. This shift in focus back 
again on weaker groups in the labour market is seemingly a step back for the PES, 
however, simultaneously the government also embarks on various measures to create 
subsidized work for precisely the groups that are weakest on the labour market.  The 
trade unions generally welcome these schemes though warn that subsidized work 
should not replace a ‘real’ job, and are adamant that the scheme’s beneficiaries move 
on to a permanent job within certain time limits.  They also explicitly oppose long-
term job placement that is (part) financed by continuous entitlement to 
unemployment pay or other benefits.   
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Within a few years, the various job schemes were under debate.  The schemes 
are expensive and their effectiveness in reintegrating people permanently back into 
the workforce is limited.  From the demand-side, the emphasis shifts to the supply-
side to create the successful conditions for an activating labour market policy.  At the 
same time, where the credo in the 1990s was jobs, and more jobs, in the 2000s the 
emphasis shifts from a job guarantee to employment security. Employment security 
means that workers have the confidence that they can move from job to job or back 
into work whenever necessary (WRR, Investeren in werkzekerheid, 2007). An important 
component in building this confidence is the offer of career development through 
continuous training and education.  These issues have figured prominently in 
collective bargaining since the early 1990s, with 90% of those covered by collective 
bargaining in 2007 having the possibility to demand leave for training and education, 
40% having a formal entitlement to further education, and 76% having the possibility 
to obtain an individual plan for career development.6  Often these training 
arrangements in collective bargaining agreements are supported by funding from 
joint sectoral education funds (O&O fondsen).   
 
From a group-oriented focus on vulnerable labour market participants (women, 
long-term unemployed, older workers or ethnic minorities), reintegration efforts in 
the last decade have become more individualized and market-oriented.  Anyone who 
receives a benefit and who is deemed in need of assistance with finding a job, can 
submit a plan for an individual reintegration agreement (IRO, individuele reintegratie 
overeenkomst).  If this IRO is approved, then instead of the benefits administrator, the 
individual worker decides which (private) reintegration service to use in his efforts to 
find suitable employment again.  The reintegration provider is paid by the benefits 
administrator, but no longer simply for effort delivered but according to results 
achieved (i.e., whether the worker indeed finds a job and is still employed after six 
months).  Of course, this financing formula contains a significant risk for cream-
skimming (reintegration providers only offering their services to those who are likely 
to find suitable employment soon anyhow), but compensatory measures have been 
adopted to avoid this problem.  The consistent and firm prioritizing of reintegration 
(exemplified by a work first approach to benefits claimants) is backed up by 
sanctioning of benefits, though it should be noted that cutting or denial of benefits 
occurs relatively rarely.   
 
Though trade unions support the change from job to employment security and 
hence, actively support measures that increase the employability of workers (e.g., 
training and schooling, but also provision of childcare, acceptance of flexible work 
hours), they are wary of the negative effects on solidarity of increased 
individualization and market provision.  In addition to the important political and 
regulatory role they play in the Dutch consultation economy, both at central level (in 
various bi-and tripartite bodies, advising on legislation) and at sub-national level (in 
collective bargaining, but also in the implementation of labour market policies or 
social benefits), trade unions have tailored their individual member services to help 
meet the demands brought by the new paradigm of employment security.  For 
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example, members that want help drawing up an IRO can call upon the services of a 
job seekers consultant from the union.   
 
Notwithstanding the trade unions confirming yet again at the Participation 
Summit in June 2007 (at which the government discussed labour market issues with 
the social partners) their acceptance of the goal to help more people into work and 
increase labour market participation, there are indications that the concept of 
flexicurity has reached its limits.  At the request of the trade unions, the 
government’s plan to relax dismissal laws was explicitly excluded from discussion at 
the Participation Summit. For the trade unions (but perhaps more so for the main 
trade union federation, FNV, than for the smaller Christian Trade Union federation, 
CNV) the balance in recent years has been too much on flexibility and not enough 
on security. A compromise where the relaxation of firing procedures would be offset 
by active labour market policies such as outplacement or integration trajectories into 
new jobs was not on the table; the FNV categorically rejected the government’s 
proposal to relax firing procedures. With the SER unable to provide a unanimous 
advice, the government referred the matter to an expert committee. The report 
produced by this committee (Commissie arbeidsparticipatie (Bakker), 2008) contained 
several suggestions for furthering activation, but to the trade unions’ relief a radical 
reform of dismissal laws was no longer among them. 
 
In sum, the turn to an activating welfare state has fundamentally changed the 
role of social partners in Dutch policy-making. The various reforms have entailed a 
loss of social partnership in the administration of social security in favour of a more 
incentive driven/ market-orientated system that is more individually tailored and 
decentrally implemented. The decentralisation and individualisation of activation, 
however, does not necessarily mean a loss of influence for trade unions. Rather, it 
seems to have led to a refocusing of their role as representatives of their core 
membership. The trade union federations remain firmly ensconced at the top tables 
of policy-making in the Netherlands, where their voice is still heard (and sought?), as 
exemplified by their successful participation in the recent debate on changes to 
employment protection legislation.   
 
Thus, similarly to the French case, the key to explaining the unions’ attitude to 
activation policies seems to lie in their strategic pursuit of organisational interests 
under changing political conditions. The unions could not but embrace the new 
activation paradigm in the early 1990s when they found themselves under 
parliamentary scrutiny for their perceived collusion in the use of social security funds 
for economic restructuring.  Contrary to the French unions, the Dutch unions have 
arguably been less successful in the defense of their organisational interests at local 
and regional level as they have lost many of their prerogatives on the administration 
of labour market and social policies.  They have been successful however in 
defending their strategic position in social partnership at national level even if they 
have not been able to fend off the government’s privatisation drives on 
implementation. In fact, somewhat ironically, the government’s push for increased 
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marketization may have helped the unions’ to refocus on new opportunities by 
redefining their members’ needs. 
 
 
Discussion: Ideas, institutional incentives and strategic trade-offs 
 
Despite the similar physiognomy of the French, Italian and Dutch labour 
movements and the comparable regulatory context of the three national labour 
markets, the above discussion has shown that the pattern of union reactions to 
activation reforms differed considerably across the cases. In the Dutch case initial 
enthusiasm has given way to a more hesitant attitude, while in the Italian case the 
opposite is true. In France, by contrast, some union support for activation policies is 
visible across the period as a whole, but has become less selective over time. 
 
The observed patterns are difficult to account for from the perspective of 
insider-outsider theories of union behaviour. Certainly, the growing reticence of the 
Dutch unions towards activation and employment-promoting labour market reform 
more generally coincided with a fall in the unemployment rate to record lows in the 
2000s, while the warming of the Italian unions to activation corresponds with a 
period when investment in passive labour market policies – and thus the fiscal 
burden of supporting the unemployed – was increasing. In the French case, however, 
the generalisation of union support for activation at turn of the last century in fact 
corresponded with a period of historic employment growth, while benefit levels have 
been high across the period as a whole. More generally, if unions in heavily regulated 
labour markets were as straightforwardly sectional as the insider-outsider approach 
suggests, we would expect rather less variation in unions’ reactions to activation 
policies both across the cases and within them over time. 
 
Nor, however, is there considerable evidence from the cases that union positions 
on activation policies have been shaped by the self-conscious pursuit of revitalisation 
strategies. While there are indications – especially from the Dutch and Italian cases – 
that unions have been influenced by activation as a policy idea, this seems to have 
been less based on calculations regarding recruitment opportunities than on a more 
general need to adapt to the terms of the main labour market policy debates at 
domestic and European levels. As Valkenburg (2004: 589) points out, “if the unions 
oppose [activation] and continue defending traditional rights to income protection 
only, it will be hard for them to play a relevant role in the contemporary political 
debate”. The recent cooling of the attitudes of Dutch unions to activation suggests 
however that, at least where the unions are sure of their more general legitimacy as 
policy actors, more material organisational or membership benefits may be necessary 
to sustain ideational change within unions over time. 
 
The three cases all suggest that the desire to gain or retain valued roles in the 
governance and administration of labour market policy – which bring financial and 
power resources that are particularly valuable to unions at a time of declining 
membership – have shaped union support for activation policies more decisively. 
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Trade unions are, in other words, not only vote- and policy-seekers, but also office 
seekers (Natali and Rhodes, 2004), and office-seeking motive have helped to 
structure their preferences on policies in this field. In Italy, union support for 
activation was thus influenced at the margins by access to European funding streams 
and the aim of maximising the budget of satellite organisations involved in the 
delivery of activation measures. In the Netherlands, inversely, the cooling of union 
attitudes to activation coincided with their exclusion from historic governance roles 
in the late 1990s. In France the unions’ attitudes to activation have always been 
articulated with their desire to defend the integrity of the paritaire unemployment 
insurance system, leading them first to oppose activation in unemployment insurance 
and then, when the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ cast by the government lengthened and the 
employers organisations adopted new positions, to embrace it. 
 
This last example suggests that unions’ positions on activation policies have been 
informed by their assessment of other actors’ intentions with respect to institutional 
reform, and their desire to lever least bad outcomes in this context. The three cases 
also suggest, finally, that this is equally true with respect to the broader labour market 
policy reform agenda. Unions have been willing to strategically trade their support 
for activation policies against the foreclosing of policy alternatives that they, or their 
members, dislike more. In the French case this was evidenced in the unions’ selective 
support for an activating approach in social benefit schemes other than 
unemployment insurance, which they preferred to the development of pure 
assistance policies that might risk undermining the social insurance basis of the 
French social protection system in the medium-term. In the Dutch case it was visible 
in the unions’ support for activation policies as an alternative to simple cuts in 
benefit entitlements. In the Italian case, finally, it was seen in the unions’ support for 
activation in return for the government agreeing to shelve fundamental reform of 
EPL, which was the most highly valued policy outcome for the core membership of 
the Italian unions. 
 
In summary, if the logics of sectionalism and revitalisation both capture very real 
dimensions of the motives for union attitudes to policy change, their impact on trade 
union positions on any given policy  - such as activation - appears to be strongly 
mediated by the strategic and institutional context. Union defence of the narrow 
interests of its membership cannot be understood in the abstract, but must be seen in 
relation to the concrete bargaining agenda and the power and determination of other 
policy actors. While in the abstract unions might oppose activation policies, in 
practice they will likely be prepared to strategically support them if they are the only 
alternative to even more painful reforms. Likewise, while unions are capable of 
reflexive modernisation and open to new policy ideas that perhaps drive against the 
interests of the existing membership, how willingly they take these up will likely 
depend on the structure of incentives provided by the institutional environment. 
Where agenda broadening also carries immediate pay-offs for unions in terms of 
access to organisational resources and influence, it will likely be more popular. But as 
the Dutch case illustrates nicely, when the other pay-offs disappear, even an 
apparently well-entrenched modernising position can be vulnerable to backsliding. 
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Conclusion 
 
Although their stance on activation policies seems to offer a crucial test of how 
trade unions can and do adapt to a changing labour market structure and the 
emergence of new social risks, little research has to date been done on this issue. The 
aim of this paper was to take a – preliminary and tentative - first step in remedying 
this situation. Its comparison of the French, Italian and Dutch cases has shown, 
firstly, that there has been considerable variation in the attitude of unions to these 
reforms, even in relatively similar labour market contexts. In each case, moreover, 
union attitudes have also varied in time, though the movement has not been 
unidirectional. While some of the cross-case variation can be explained with 
reference to the permeability of the national union movements to new policy ideas, 
the paper has argued that the best explanations of variation in space and time are the 
differing (and changing) institutional incentive structures facing the unions, on the 
one hand, and their strategic trading of policy options in the light of the changing 
priorities and agendas of other actors, on the other. 
 
The findings imply that in this policy field, and very probably in others, the 
struggle between sectionalism and revitalisation is not necessarily the most useful way 
of interpreting policy choice in contemporary trade unions. While the revitalisation 
perspective probably over-estimates the capacity of trade unions to overcome short-
termism, assumptions of simple sectionalism applied to particular policy areas 
underplay the complexity of bargaining agendas and simplify the incentive structures 
facing union leaderships. Depending on the policy alternatives on the table, or on the 
organisational pay-offs available, short-term, self-interested strategies may well lead 
unions fall-in line with policies that benefit new social risk groups. Further research 
that leads to better modelling of these factors will allow a richer understanding on 
the scope for and limits on welfare state reforms in contexts where the unions 
remain influential actors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 As well as an anonymous reviewer, the authors would like to thank Deborah Mabbett, Waltraud 
Schelkle and the members of the University of Edinburgh ‘Work Economy and Welfare’ research 
group for valuable comments on an earlier version of this paper. 
 
2 The notion of ‘market-reinforcing activation policies’ excludes measures such as large job creation 
schemes in the public or para-public sectors that are sometimes included with activation measures in 
the broader concept of ‘active labour market policy’, despite having very different distributive 
consequences. The notion of activation is used here to denote only market-reinforcing measures, the 
political dynamics of which are the focus of this article. 
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3 Nelson (2009) found some empirical support for this hypothesis in her study of attitudes to active 
labour market policies among trade union members. 
 
4 The third large French confederation, the CGT, retained close links to the highly orthodox French 
Communist Party (PCF) up until the early 1990s, and as a result until this time adopted systematically 
oppositional positions on almost every governmental policy or collective bargaining topic. As a result 
the CGT is not further considered in this discussion. 
 
5 Marked by the name Conseil National du Patronat Français (CNPF) being replaced with Mouvement des 
Entreprises de France (MEDEF). 
 
6 „The Netherlands: Flexicurity and Industrial Relations, EIROnline NL0803039, 
www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/ 
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